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BRIEF FOR AMICI CURIAE  
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER 
 
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE* 
Kansas Coalition Against Sexual and Domes-
tic Violence (KCSDV) is a nonprofit organization de-
voted to remedying domestic violence through legal, 
legislative, and policy initiatives, as well as providing 
advocacy and legal and counseling services to survi-
vors of domestic violence.  KCSDV works with survi-
vors of domestic violence, including undertaking ex-
tensive efforts to improve the justice system’s 
response to victims of domestic violence.  KCSDV also 
represents clients that are threatened and stalked 
through the use of social media and other technology. 
Legal Momentum—the Women’s Legal De-
fense and Education Fund, is the nation’s oldest 
legal advocacy organization for women.  Legal Mo-
mentum advances the rights of all women and girls, 
with a particular focus on addressing gender-based vi-
olence, by using the power of the law and creating in-
novative public policy.  For example, Legal Momen-
tum was the leading advocate for the landmark 
Violence Against Women Act and its subsequent reau-
thorizations, which seek to redress the historical in-
adequacy of the justice system’s response to domestic 
                                                
 * Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, amici represent that 
this brief was not authored in whole or in part by any party or 
counsel for any party.  No person or party other than amici, their 
members, or their counsel made a monetary contribution to the 
preparation or submission of this brief.  Counsel of record for all 
parties received notice of the filing of this brief pursuant to Rule 
37.2 and each has consented to its filing. 
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violence.  Legal Momentum also represents victims of 
domestic violence who suffer discrimination and inad-
equate justice system responses.  Legal Momentum’s 
National Judicial Education Program has, since 1981, 
educated the judiciary on issues related to gender bias 
and the adjudication of cases involving domestic and 
sexual violence and, in particular, the intersection of 
the two. 
National Crime Victim Law Institute 
(NCVLI) is a nonprofit educational and advocacy or-
ganization located at Lewis & Clark Law School in 
Portland, Oregon.  NCVLI’s mission is to actively pro-
mote balance and fairness in the justice system 
through crime-victim-centered legal advocacy, educa-
tion, and resource sharing.  NCVLI accomplishes its 
mission through education and training; technical as-
sistance to attorneys; promotion of the National Alli-
ance of Victims’ Rights Attorneys; research and anal-
ysis of developments in crime victim law; and 
provision of information on crime victim law to crime 
victims and other members of the public.  In addition, 
NCVLI actively participates as amicus curiae in cases 
involving crime victims’ rights nationwide. 
National Organization for Victim Assistance 
(NOVA) is the oldest victims’ rights and services or-
ganization in the world.  Operating since 1975, NOVA 
promotes training for victim advocates, provides di-
rect services to victims, and seeks to educate legisla-
tive, political, law enforcement, and community lead-
ers on issues associated with victimization so that 
appropriate and effective policies can be implemented.  
As one of its services, NOVA provides a nationwide 
toll-free number (800-TRY-NOVA) for victims to call 
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directly for referrals, resources, and information to en-
hance their awareness for making choices while seek-
ing justice, remedy, and recovery.  NOVA also advo-
cates for crime victims’ rights by actively participating 
as an amicus curiae in cases throughout the country. 
  




The uncertainty and perpetual terror created by 
violent threats is not just a precondition for domestic 
violence—it is a pervasive manifestation of that vio-
lence.  Abusers use threats to exert power over their 
victims—controlling them through intimidation, fear, 
and isolation.  Not only are violent threats highly cor-
related with physical violence, but research also 
shows that violent threats frequently cause trauma as 
severe as physical violence. 
If permitted to stand, the decision below—which 
requires the state to prove that an abuser had a spe-
cific intent to cause fear—will make prosecuting and 
preventing domestic violence even more challenging, 
without any corresponding benefit.  There is rarely di-
rect evidence of specific intent, and domestic-violence 
victims often struggle to confront their abusers in 
court.  Indeed, the impact of abusers’ psychological, 
emotional, and physical abuse is often so severe that 
victims frequently struggle even to seek help. 
This Court should grant the petition and reverse 
the decision below.  The First Amendment does not 
require proof of specific intent to punish violent 
threats.  The Kansas Supreme Court’s decision to im-
pose that requirement is inconsistent with decisions 
from other courts, the law in over a dozen states, the 
Model Penal Code, and the history and tradition of the 
First Amendment.  Allowed to stand, it will under-
mine not only the state’s ability to prosecute and inca-
pacitate domestic abusers but also victims’ ability to 
obtain justice and protection. 
1. By the time respondent Ryan Johnson threat-
ened to kill his mother and burn her house down, the 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3561883
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police had already been summoned twice in the pre-
ceding four days in response to Johnson’s abusive be-
havior.  Pet. App. 70–71.  The first contact was a wel-
fare check to investigate allegations that Johnson was 
abusing his mother.  Pet. App. 70.  Johnson’s mother 
“reported [to officers] that Johnson had been causing 
problems in her home” and that “she was afraid for 
her safety.”  Pet. App. 70. 
A few nights later, Johnson’s mother called 911 
when Johnson flew into a violent rage.  Johnson’s wife 
had sought refuge in a locked room, but Johnson 
kicked the door open with such force that he damaged 
the frame and broke the metal clasp.  Pet. App. 70, 88–
89.  Johnson fled before police arrived.  Pet. App. 70. 
The next morning, Johnson broke into his 
mother’s home, ripped her phone off the wall, and told 
her to “[t]ry to call the sheriff now, bitch.”  Pet. App. 
70.  Johnson then threatened to kill his mother and 
burn her house down.  Pet. App. 71.   
He was eventually apprehended and charged with 
criminally threatening his mother.  Pet. App. 71. 
As in many cases of domestic violence, Johnson’s 
mother and wife “downplayed the two incidents” at 
trial, testifying that “the family commonly threatened 
to kill each other but did not mean it.”  Pet. App. 71.  
The jury nevertheless convicted him and he was sen-
tenced to fourteen months’ imprisonment.  Pet. App. 73. 
2. Respondent Timothy Boettger frequented the 
Kwik Shop where Cody Bonham worked.  Pet. App. 
37.  Boettger was well acquainted with Bonham—
Boettger had dated Bonham’s aunt, and had known 
Bonham’s father, a detective in the sheriff’s depart-
ment, since high school.  Pet. App. 4. 
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One night, Boettger showed up at the Kwik Shop 
“unusually intense”—furious that his daughter’s dog 
had been shot and left for dead in a ditch, and that the 
sheriff’s department had failed to investigate the inci-
dent.  Pet. App. 4.  Fists clenched and visibly shaking, 
Boettger approached Bonham and told him:  “[I’ve got] 
some friends * * * that don’t mess around”—“[You’re] 
going to end up finding [your] dad in a ditch”—“You 
remember that.”  Pet. App. 4. 
A jury convicted Boettger of threatening to com-
mit violence with reckless disregard of the risk of 
causing fear.  Pet. App. 5.  He was sentenced to a sus-
pended seven months’ imprisonment. 
3. On appeal, both respondents argued that the 
First Amendment precludes the state from punishing 
violent threats absent proof of specific intent to place 
the victim in fear.  Pet. App. 5, 73.  The Kanas Court 
of Appeals affirmed both convictions and respondents 
sought review in the Kansas Supreme Court. 
The Kansas Supreme Court reversed both convic-
tions.  Pet. App. 35, 81.  In doing so, it exacerbated a 
well-developed split by joining the minority of courts 
that believe this Court’s decision in Virginia v. Black, 
538 U.S. 343 (2003), compels the conclusion that spe-
cific intent is constitutionally required to punish vio-
lent threats.  Pet. App. 27; see Pet. 11–16. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Violent threats strike immediate fear in the 
hearts of their victims.  Elonis v. United States, 135 S. 
Ct. 2001, 2016 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (“A threat may cause serious emo-
tional stress for the person threatened and those who 
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care about that person, and a threat may lead to a vi-
olent confrontation.”).  Like “those personally abusive 
epithets, which * * * are generally proscribable under 
the First Amendment,” such threats “are, as a matter 
of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke 
[such a] reaction.”  Black, 538 U.S. at 359 (quoting Co-
hen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971), and citing 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 
(1942)). 
That effect—immediate, visceral fear and terror—
is precisely what makes violent threats so dangerous 
and so effective.  Nowhere is that more true than in 
the domestic-violence context.  “Threats of violence 
and intimidation are among the most favored weap-
ons of domestic abusers.”  Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2017 
(Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(noting that “the rise of social media has only made 
those tactics more commonplace”). 
Critically, the effect—and effectiveness—of vio-
lent threats does not turn on whether abusers specifi-
cally intend to strike fear in the hearts of their vic-
tims, or whether they merely consciously disregard 
the substantial and unjustifiable risk of doing so.  The 
damage is done either way.  Id. at 2016 (“whether or 
not the person making a threat intends to cause harm, 
the damage is the same”).  In addition to causing seri-
ous emotional distress, violent threats also cultivate 
and perpetuate an environment of intimidation, isola-
tion, and control that subjects victims to more coercion 
and abuse. 
Particularly given that this Court “generally ha[s] 
not required a heightened mental state under the 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3561883
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First Amendment for historically unprotected catego-
ries of speech,” there is “no reason” why the Court 
“should give threats pride of place among unprotected 
speech.”  Id. at 2027–28 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
That is especially true given that this Court has never 
held that “the First Amendment requires a particular 
mental state for threat prosecutions.”  Id. at 2026. 
This Court’s review is warranted.  The split is well 
developed and intractable.  And the harm to victims is 
unconscionable and immeasurable.  Violent threats 
are integral to physical domestic violence, which 
claims twenty victims per minute in this country.  Re-
quiring specific intent has no salutary benefits—it 
only makes it harder for victims to seek protection and 
obtain justice and for the state to prosecute and inca-
pacitate domestic abusers.  The petition should be 
granted, and the decision below reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. ABSENT THIS COURT’S REVIEW, THE 
DECISION BELOW WILL MAKE IT HARDER 
FOR DOMESTIC-ABUSE VICTIMS TO SECURE 
PROTECTION AND JUSTICE. 
Domestic violence is a nationwide scourge that 
impacts 10 million people each year.  Martin R. 
Huecker & William Smock, Domestic Violence (2020), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/nbk499891.  That 
means “an average of 20 people experience intimate 
partner physical violence every minute.”  National Co-
alition Against Domestic Violence, National Statistics:  
Domestic Violence Fact Sheet 1, https://assets.speakcdn 
.com/assets/2497/domestic_violence2.pdf.  And every 
day, nearly three women are killed by their current 
or former intimate partners.  Violence Policy Center, 
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When Men Murder Women 3 (2019), http://vpc.org 
/studies/wmmw2019.pdf. 
“Threats of violence and intimidation are among 
the most favored weapons of domestic abusers,” who 
use threats to establish dominance and maintain con-
trol over their victims by instilling terror, fear, and 
uncertainty.  Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2017 (Alito, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part); see Catherine 
F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection 
for Battered Women:  An Analysis of State Statutes & 
Case Law, 21 Hofstra L. Rev. 801, 859 (1993) (“threats 
of violence * * * are acts of domestic violence because 
they seek to intimidate and control”). 
Domestic abusers frequently use violent threats 
as part of a “course of calculated, malevolent conduct,” 
which involves “interweaving repeated physical abuse 
with three equally important tactics:  [1] intimidation, 
[2] isolation, and [3] control.”  Evan Stark, Coercive 
Control:  How Men Entrap Women in Personal Life 5 
(2007); see Mary Ann Dutton & Lisa A. Goodman, Co-
ercion in Intimate Partner Violence:  Toward a New 
Conceptualization, 52 Sex Roles 743, 743 (2005) (abus-
ers assert “power over the[ir] victim[s] through the 
use of threats, as well as actual violence”). 
First, violent threats create and maintain a cli-
mate of fear and doubt for the victim.  Unlike physical 
abuse, which has temporal and geographic bounds, vi-
olent threats are “unpredictable yet omnipresent,” 
creating unbounded fear and uncertainty that leads to 
“hyper-vigilant behavior and symptoms of hyper-
arousal as a function of the unpredictable nature of 
the traumatic stressor.”  Mindy B. Mechanic et al., 
Mental Health Consequences of Intimate Partner 
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Abuse:  A Multidimensional Assessment of Four Differ-
ent Forms of Abuse, 17 Violence Against Women 634, 
644 (2008), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles 
/pmc2967430/pdf/nihms245802.pdf. 
Indeed, a “large body of research” has found the 
extreme psychological and physiological stress cre-
ated by a climate of menace and persistent threats 
may actually be more damaging than the physical vi-
olence being threatened.  Dutton & Goodman, 52 Sex 
Roles at 753; see Mechanic et al., 17 Violence Against 
Women at 635. 
Second, violent threats prevent victims from seek-
ing help.  Violent threats create and reinforce a fear of 
escalation that is well founded, as research indicates 
what common sense suggests:  violent threats lead to 
physical violence in over half of domestic-abuse inci-
dents.  Mary P. Brewster, Stalking by Former Inti-
mates:  Verbal Threats and Other Predictors of Physi-
cal Violence, 15 Violence & Victims 41, 41–54 (2000) 
(“Threats of violence were significantly correlated 
with actual physical violence in every model.”). 
Third, violent threats coerce compliance and exert 
control by “deflat[ing] the victim’s will to resist.”  Evan 
Stark, Coercive Control, in Violence Against Women:  
Current Theory & Practice in Domestic Abuse, Sexual 
Violence, and Exploitation 17, 23 (2013).  “Coercive 
control * * * is a dynamic process linking a demand 
with a credible threatened negative consequence for 
noncompliance.”  Dutton & Goodman, 52 Sex Roles at 
746–47; see Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2015 (Alito, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining 
how abusers control their victims by creating “serious 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3561883
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emotional stress for the person threatened and those 
who care about that person”). 
Given “a sufficiently serious threat, coercion can 
occur in a relationship even when there has been no 
prior violence or threat to ‘soften’ the [victim’s] re-
sistance.”  Dutton & Goodman, 52 Sex Roles at 747.  
“Exposure to coercive acts means exposure to threats 
of harm, including those that would be considered 
traumatic stressors such as threats of harm to self or 
others.”  Id. at 752.  Many violent threats “meet the 
event criterion for posttraumatic stress disorder.”  
Ibid.  So it should come as no surprise that “the con-
sequences of coercive control include the range” of 
mental and physical health problems “associated with 
traumatic exposure”—including depression, anxiety, 
gastrointestinal problems, sleep problems, and hyper-
tension.  Id. at 753; see Mechanic et al., 17 Violence 
Against Women at 642. 
For example, studies show that as many as 84 per-
cent of domestic-violence victims suffer from PTSD—
compared to about 10 percent of the general popula-
tion and 26 percent of crime victims.  Dutton & Good-
man, 52 Sex Roles at 753 (noting the prevalence of de-
pression ranges from 15–70 percent among domestic-
violence victims, compared to 10–20 percent among 
the general population). 
In addition to “the adverse mental health out-
comes” faced by domestic-violence victims, there is 
also “a significant relationship between [domestic 
abuse] and poor [physical] health outcomes, including 
self-reported heath status, somatic symptoms, risk of 
illness, and exacerbated medical conditions.”  Ibid.  
Studies have shown that “[p]sychological violence was 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3561883
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associated with self-reported poor physical health as 
well as other specific medical problems, including 
chronic neck or back pain, arthritis, migraines or 
other frequent headaches, and stomach ulcer.”  Ibid.; 
see Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2016 (Alito, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (“A threat may cause se-
rious emotional stress for the person threatened and 
those who care about that person, and a threat may 
lead to a violent confrontation.”). 
In sum, violent threats—particularly in the do-
mestic-abuse context—inflict great harm.  By making 
it harder to prosecute such threats, the Kansas Su-
preme Court has made it easier for domestic abusers 
to inflict abuse on their victims.  This Court’s review 
is needed to eliminate this unnecessary barrier to pro-
tecting victims and securing justice. 
II. THE DECISION BELOW MISCONSTRUES THIS 
COURT’S PRECEDENT, JOINS THE WRONG 
SIDE OF A WELL-DEVELOPED SPLIT, AND 
NEEDLESSLY HAMPERS VICTIMS’ ACCESS TO 
JUSTICE. 
Violent threats “inflict great harm and have little 
if any social value”—they “cause serious emotional 
stress for the person threatened and those who care 
about that person.”  Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2016 (Alito, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“a 
threat may lead to a violent confrontation”).  The court 
below erroneously believed this Court’s precedent 
compelled the result it reached—but this Court has 
never held that the First Amendment requires any 
particular mental state (specific intent or otherwise) 
to punish violent threats.  And for good reason. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3561883
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There is nothing in the First Amendment’s history 
or tradition that would compel imposing a specific-in-
tent requirement.  “ ‘From 1791 to the present, our so-
ciety has permitted restrictions upon the content of 
speech in a few limited areas,’ true threats being one 
of them.”  Id. at 2024 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (ellipses 
omitted) (quoting R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 
382–83 (1992)). 
Violent threats, like fighting words, inflict injury 
“by their very utterance” and are “of such slight social 
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be 
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social 
interest in order and morality.”  Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. 
at 572.  Such threats “are generally proscribable un-
der the First Amendment” precisely because they 
“are, as a matter of common knowledge, inherently 
likely to provoke [harmful psychological and physio-
logical] reaction.”  Black, 538 U.S. at 359.1 
And the impact on—and harm to—victims is the 
same “whether or not the person making a threat in-
tends to cause harm.”  Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2016 (Alito, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“the fact 
that making a threat may have a therapeutic or ca-
thartic effect for the speaker is not sufficient to justify 
constitutional protection”).  Focusing on a violent 
threat’s impact, rather than on the speaker’s subjec-
tive intent, better comports with this Court’s First 
Amendment jurisprudence.  Indeed, imposing an “in-
tent-to-threaten requirement * * * would make threats 
one of the most protected categories of unprotected 
                                                
 1 As the Black Court explained, the government has a compel-
ling interest in not only preventing violence, but also protecting 
its citizens from the fear, terror, and disruption caused by threats.  
538 U.S. at 360 (quoting R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388). 
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speech,” which in turn would “sow[ ] tension through-
out [the Court’s] First Amendment doctrine.”  Id. at 
2027 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
For example, fighting words can be punished 
“without proof of an intent to provoke a violent reac-
tion”; obscenity can be punished “without proof that 
[the perpetrator] knew the materials were legally ob-
scene”; and defamation can be punished “even if the 
speaker acted negligently with respect to the falsity of 
[his] statements.”  Ibid. (citing cases); see id. at 2017 
(Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(“proof that false statements were made with reckless 
disregard of their falsity” is sufficient to establish both 
civil and criminal liability) (citing cases). 
Imposing a specific-intent requirement is not only 
unnecessary, but also harmful—unduly burdening 
victims and impeding the punishment and incapacita-
tion of abusers.  “Requiring evidence of specific intent” 
in violent-threat prosecutions would “prove to be very 
difficult and time-consuming” without generating any 
coordinate benefits.  United States v. Bradbury, 111 
F. Supp. 3d 918, 923 (N.D. Ind. 2015); see Jerman v. 
Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559 
U.S. 573, 596 n.14 (2010) (“specific intent * * * is dif-
ficult to prove”). 
Specific intent “is always determined by objective 
means”—what others heard and can testify about.  
Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 154 (2004).  In the 
domestic-violence context, the victim—the person best 
positioned to testify about the content and context of 
the threat—is often (and understandably) unwilling 
or unable to do so.  See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Recog-
nizing and Remedying the Harm of Battering:  A Call 
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to Criminalize Domestic Violence, 94 J. Crim. L. & 
Criminology 959, 994, 1022 (2004). 
It is well established that “[v]ictims of domestic 
violence are more prone than other crime victims to 
recant or refuse to cooperate after initially providing 
information to police.”  Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Bat-
terers after Crawford, 91 Va. L. Rev. 747, 768 (2005); 
see People v. Brown, 94 P.3d 574, 576 (Cal. 2004) 
(quoting expert’s testimony that “80 to 85 percent of 
victims ‘actually recant at some point in the pro-
cess’ ”).  That should come as no surprise, given not 
only the history of intimidation, isolation, and coercive 
control frequently experienced by victims, but also the 
very real risk of future physical and psychological ret-
ribution.  This dynamic understandably deters victims 
of domestic violence from invoking the legal process in 
the first place—to say nothing of having to confront the 
abuser in open court.  See, e.g., Evan Stark, Re-Repre-
senting Woman Battering:  From Battered Woman’s 
Syndrome to Coercive Control, 58 Alb. L. Rev. 973, 
1010–11 (1995).  As one researcher explained: 
Some women may correctly fear retaliation 
by the abuser, based on their knowledge of 
the abuser’s personality and psychology.  
Others who are suffering from PTSD may 
avoid talking to their legal representatives, 
miss appointments, or avoid going to court 
because they cannot bear to re-invoke the 
traumatic experiences by talking and think-
ing about them. 
Joan S. Meier, Notes From the Underground:  Inte-
grating Psychological and Legal Perspectives on Do-
mestic Violence in Theory and Practice, 21 Hofstra L. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3561883
16 
 
Rev. 1295, 1345 (1993) (victims’ “[a]mbivalence about 
pursuing legal action” stems from “very realistic con-
cerns”); see also Stark, 58 Alb. L. Rev. at 1025 (de-
scribing the “mix of social and psychological factors 
that makes it seemingly impossible for the [domestic-
violence] victim to permanently escape or to effec-
tively protect herself”). 
Requiring the state to prove specific intent in do-
mestic-violence cases would needlessly exacerbate an 
already life-threatening problem and make it even 
harder for victims of domestic violence to access jus-
tice—and safety.2 
The Kansas statute declared unconstitutional by 
the court below—like the Model Penal Code and the 
statutes in a number of other states (Pet. 23 n.3)—
strikes a reasonable balance in protecting abuse vic-
tims and free speech by requiring proof of reckless-
ness as to the effect of the threat on the victim.  Kan. 
Stat. § 21-5415(a)(1) (requiring a threat of violence 
made in reckless disregard for causing fear); Model 
Penal Code § 211.3 (“A person is guilty of a felony of the 
third degree if he threatens to commit any crime of 
violence with purpose to terrorize another * * * or in 
reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror.”). 
                                                
 2 The collateral consequences of constitutionalizing a specific-
intent requirement bring the stakes of this case into even 
sharper relief.  As one commentator has explained, because at 
least eighteen states link the availability of civil protection or-
ders to proof that a criminal threat was made, requiring evidence 
that the abuser acted with specific intent will make it “even more 
difficult for victims of domestic violence” to obtain such orders—
which are one of the most critical legal tools available to victims.  
Maria A. Brusco, Note, Read This Note or Else!:  Conviction under 
18 U.S.C. § 875(c) for Recklessly Making a Threat, 84 Fordham L. 
Rev. 2845, 2874–75 (2016). 
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Requiring recklessness ameliorates any concern 
that not requiring proof of specific intent “will chill 
statements that do not qualify as true threats, e.g., 
statements that may be literally threatening but are 
plainly not meant to be taken seriously.”  Elonis, 135 
S. Ct. at 2017 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part) (“[W]e have also held that the law provides 
adequate breathing space when it requires proof that 
false statements were made with reckless disregard of 
their falsity.  Requiring proof of recklessness is simi-
larly sufficient here.”) (internal citations omitted). 
The Kansas statute here (like those in many other 
states) also appropriately reflects the reality that do-
mestic abusers regularly follow through on their 
threats.  See Brewster, 15 Violence & Victims at 41–
54 (“Threats of violence [are] significantly correlated 
with actual physical violence in every model”—lead-
ing to significant physical violence in well over half of 
the cases). 
The facts of Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. 
Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984), prove the point.  Tracey 
Thurman’s estranged husband, Charles, spent the 
better part of a year threatening to murder her and 
their infant son, C.J.  Id. at 1524–25.  Tracey’s com-
plaints to the police were “ignored or rejected.”  Ibid.  
Things escalated when Charles attacked Tracey and 
kidnapped their son.  Ibid.  After Charles returned—
smashing Tracey’s windshield and screaming threats 
at her while she was sitting in her car—he was ar-
rested and received a six-month suspended sentence.  
Ibid.  For the next five months, he repeatedly threat-
ened to kill Tracey.  Ibid.  She got a restraining order 
against him, but it did nothing to stop the barrage of 
threats.  Ibid. 
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A month later, Charles stabbed Tracey 13 times 
in her chest, neck, and throat outside her home.  Ibid.  
When the police arrived, they watched as Charles 
dropped the bloody knife, kicked Tracey in the head, 
and ran inside her home.  Id. at 1526.  He came back 
with their son C.J. and dropped the child on Tracey’s 
wounded body before kicking her in the head a second 
time.  Ibid.  Tracey survived the attack but was left 
partially paralyzed. 
Throughout her ordeal, Tracey sought the protec-
tion of the criminal-justice system, reporting the 
threats to police and obtaining a restraining order and 
even an arrest—to no avail.  Restraining orders and 
arrests are important first steps, see James Ptacek, 
Battered Women in the Courtroom:  The Power of Ju-
dicial Responses 164–65 (1999), but incapacitation 
and incarceration are critical to domestic-violence vic-
tims’ safety and well-being.  The First Amendment 
does not require the criminal-justice system to wait 
until domestic abusers finally make good on their vio-
lent threats before taking action to protect and vindi-
cate victims. 




For the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant 
the petition for certiorari. 
Respectfully submitted. 
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